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JUDGING A BOOK BY ITS COVER 





An individuals legal identity can be constituted by a multitude of 
often-complex notions, and is not necessarily of their own 
construction. Legal discourse has a significant role to play in the 
construction of an individuals legal identity and can apply to 
gender identity as much as any other. This construction can occur 
not just through what is written or said, but also by and through the 
image(s) of law. The image presented to the viewer is prescriptive 
in both its nature and operation. This paper deliberately chooses a 
medium which is often omitted from analysis — the front cover of 
an undergraduate textbook — and offers a reading of some of the 
images that are selected to adorn certain text family law textbooks. 
It argues that the cover can be read as visual rhetoric as powerful 
and as constitutive of legal identity as the written words within the 
book. If left unchallenged, laws cultural prejudices are often 
shielded from critical examination, leaving the operation of power 
and truth within discourse to continue uncritiqued and 
unquestioned.  
Introduction 
There is nothing more fit to be looked at than the outside of a book.1 
Last year, 2008, marked the 25-year anniversary of the first edition of Hoggett 
and Pearl’s The Family, Law and Society.2 This quarter-century has seen 
significant, fundamental and wide-reaching changes in family law. Some of 
those legislative changes have included The Children Act 1989, the Human 
Rights Act 1988, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1991, which have wrought deep changes upon the 
landscape of family law and indeed upon the discourse of family law. Twenty-
five years ago, the idea that same-sex couples could enter into a legally 
recognised union and adopt children would have seemed far fetched. However, 
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while statute and the common law have changed, there are aspects of family law 
discourse that have not. The discourse of the pictures and symbols found on the 
front cover of textbooks has not changed much over the last 25 years. The ‘type’ 
of family represented can still be read as constituting a familial identity which is 
(amongst others) heterosexual, able bodied, white and married. Through an 
exploration of the images deployed on the cover of a small number of family 
law textbooks published within that period, this paper traces the use of hetero-
normative pictures, symbols that associate ‘law’ with ‘family’.  
Law’s legitimacy is achieved and maintained not only through written 
discourse, but also through what I have termed ‘visual’ rhetoric. While there is a 
rich stream of work examining the power of law’s visual symbols and icons in 
other contexts, the same cannot be said about other ‘common’ visual symbols, 
such as textbook covers, which have not been addressed to a similar extent. It is 
this gap that this paper seeks to explore.  
Goodrich’s work in this area is particularly noteworthy. He has argued that: 
‘A reading of the legal text which ignores the power of its imagery … is a 
reading which is in many senses beside the point.’3 Goodrich’s 1990 book, 
Languages of Law, From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks, is one of the 
few ‘law books’ to include pictures. It explores some of the origins of the 
common law, arguing that the representation of legality have become the only 
reality in a postmodern culture.4 Kevelson’s work has utilised legal semiotics to 
argue that law can be read as a system of symbols and signs which ‘evolves 
continuously to correspond with and to represent changing norms and the social 
consciousness of any given community’.5 Jackson usefully explored the 
relationship between the object and the sign, suggesting that the sign can be 
influenced by the object and can be read as a passive element, with the object 
being the active element in interpreting any meaning given to the sign.6 
Douzinas and Nead provide an illuminating interrogation of the diverse 
relationships between law and the artistic image, exploring and uncovering what 
they argue is the hidden interdependence between law and art in relation to 
(amongst others) iconolatry and iconoclasm, and that the law ‘arranges, 
distributes and policies its own image through icons of authority and 
sovereignty, tradition and fidelity’.7 Other authors have explored the power of 
the image to law in other contexts. Raffield, for example, provides an 
illuminating analysis of the importance of clothes and their symbolic 
representational importance, particularly in the nineteenth century: 
The representational power of clothes and their capacity to embody 
institutional authority, while simultaneously delineating social status, was 
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of particular concern to Sixteenth Century legislators, as the nation-state 
supplanted the feudal model of Society.8 
There is a link here between the representation power referred to by 
Raffield and the prescriptive power of that which is represented. For example, 
the ‘nuclear’ family is often portrayed visually. Constant repetition of a 
particular visual representation of the family operates upon the subject to 
reinforce the dominant ideology of the heterosexual and family. This visual 
portrayal tends to be in a manner consistent with its written image. Part of the 
‘problem’ of trying to unsettle dominant familial constructions has been the 
‘invisibility’ of alternative discourses. Even within the academy itself, the 
problem of invisibility continues. At the level of undergraduate studies, while 
the students may (hopefully) be encouraged to think critically about law, the 
main ‘tools’ used for this are, of course, textbooks9. These immediately present 
the viewer with images of the family that are prescriptive in nature and 
operation. 
One of the purposes of law is to effect particular behaviours in individuals 
— to compel individuals to do, or not to do, a certain thing by acting as a form 
of social control: 
The purpose of all legal enactments, judicial pronouncements, contracts, 
and other legal acts is to influence men’s [sic] behaviour and direct them 
in certain ways. The legal language must be viewed primarily as a means 
to this end. It is an instrument of social control and social intercourse.10 
Arguably, law’s image(s), seek the same objective. Legendre’s suggestion 
that the image of law seeks to capture the soul of law’s subject would seem to 
support the assertion made in this paper that law’s raison d’être is to exercise 
control over both identity and behaviour: ‘the power of institutions is a product 
of their use of images’.11 Indeed, as succinctly pointed out by Raffield, ‘[there is 
an] implicit relationship between the manipulation of the image and the 
emotional attachment of the subject to the authority of law’.12 In order to 
effectively exercise control over an individual’s identity, law uses discourse to 
communicate and perpetuate its ideology. If an analysis of legal writing can be 
useful in uncovering and explaining the meanings contained within it, then it 
can be similarly useful to explore the notion that legal language uses visual 
discourse to communicate its ideology in relation to family. 
Derrida, for example, argues that ‘text’ is a process of interpretation, and is 
not necessarily limited to writing.13 In other words, ‘meaning’ is not inherent in 
any piece of writing, picture or sign, nor in what they refer to; rather, it results 
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from the relationship between the observer and the visual image. It is this which 
leads Derrida to argue that: ‘There is nothing outside of the text.’14 Thus, a 
Derridean approach would suggest that any meaning given to structures 
(without which nothing exists for us) includes and implicates any observers of 
those structures. Further, to observe is to interact; the observer constitutes 
themself as a subject in relation to the visual image. At the same time, the 
subject is also the observed; the visual image is reflected back at the subject as 
an imperative. In this respect, then, legal vision has a duality of purpose. 
Each subject of law interacts with the pictures and symbols presented. The 
meaning of the pictures on the cover of a textbook do not exist within the 
picture, or within what the picture refers to; rather, the meaning exists only as 
the relationship between the viewer and the textbook cover. The vision 
presented to the viewer produces ‘experience’ through interaction with the 
meanings associated with signs and symbols. In other words, legal subjects 
experience the effects of law’s interaction, and the meaning given to the symbol. 
Law’s vision, however, is an imperative: it masks the ‘life’ experience of the 
legal subject or subjectively lived experience. 
Law’s languages therefore extend beyond written rhetoric to include 
pictures and symbols, which can be read as deploying, reproducing and thereby 
privileging certain familial arrangements.  
While there has been a growing body of work in the area of law and the 
visual image concerning the importance of symbolism within legal culture, this 
has largely been restricted to studies of written rhetoric.15 Further, there appears 
to be little work on the importance of symbolism of visual rhetoric within legal 
culture with regard to the humble textbook. 
One exception to this is Anne Bottomley, who has explored the impact of 
the pictures used on land law books. Whilst Bottomley acknowledges that some 
might consider the cover to be relatively unimportant (‘simply packaging to the 
text’16), she nevertheless argues that the image on the cover of the text is capable 
of reproducing perceptions of the boundaries to real property:17 
intriguing patterns do emerge and do lend themselves to a reading of the 
covers themselves as a kind of text of law. Real property books are 
characterised by a focus on landscape. Indeed landscape in the sense in 
which it is most often evocatively used in the country — rural landscape. 
Other images could have been chosen; they are available. Instead the 
dominant ideology has utilised not only rural landscape but also the 
major English artists who have been themselves melded into a tradition 
of ‘Englishness’ … The uses of such imagery might not be consciously 
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invoking narratives associated with traditional identity but is surely 
reproducing them.18 
Bottomley therefore disavows ‘deep truth’ analysis and is specifically not 
making a semiotics argument here; rather, she is making an argument for a 
different ‘reading’ of the image in the reproduction of a particular legal 
identity.19  
Symbols and pictures, therefore, are worthy of attention as having meaning 
attributed to them: 
Objects are human constructs and not self existing entities with intrinsic 
natures — meanings do not reside within objects … but rather emerge out 
of the process of interpretation by which definitions are created and 
used.20  
In other words, the picture does not have an independent meaning; it is always 
symbolic of something else. The picture is intended to be representative of that 
which is ‘real’ and to take the place of the content. Stripped of any cultural, 
social or legal interpretations, the picture has no inherent meaning. It becomes 
important only when the subjective subject superimposes meaning. The subject 
brings a certain approach to interpretation; however, this is not arbitrary — it 
depends on certain contextual clues. Peirce, for example, argues that these self-
imposed meanings and interpretations are constantly being reinterpreted when 
social-legal values change. Peirce uses the notion of ‘interpretant’ to explore 
this, arguing that signs are interpreted according to contexts and that, in a world 
without interpretants, the symbol of the sickle and hammer would just be a 
picture of a sickle and hammer instead of being read as symbolic of the Soviet 
Union.21 In other words, we need new versions and interpretations to allow for 
our current prejudice. As Smart points out: ‘It’s vital to remember that the 
meanings of representations are not immutable or unitary, although there may 
be dominant forms of interpretation.’22 Therefore, pictures can be read as 
interpretative constructs whose process of assembly is a theme worthy of study 
in its own right. 
In the context of ‘the family’, this can be interpreted in two ways: first, 
familial pictures can be read as being representative of the ‘real’ family, a 
family which is stated to exist in both reality and actuality; and second, familial 
pictures can be read to signify exactly the opposite — that is, they can 
symbolise that which is not ‘real’. In this second context, the ‘familial’ picture is 
used to symbolise and promote a familial ideology. 
This dual purpose serves its function well. It can be used as both as a model 
or prototype for an idealised conception of future families, and as a reflection of 
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previous families. When used in these ways, the familial picture therefore 
continuously reproduces and reinforces its own symbolic legitimacy. 
Pictorial images directly impose a concept on the viewer’s mind in the 
form of graphic and vivid images, in ways that the written word cannot. 
Pictorial images have a more immediate and emotive effect than text. For 
example, starvation in the Third World can be read about in terms of written 
rhetoric, but it is most likely that public opinion will only be moved to action 
once these images appear in pictorial form, on television. Indeed, as Raffield 
points out, the power of the image ‘lies in its capacity to generate an emotional 
response’.23 The transfer and communication of a particular meaning can be 
achieved through the perception of an image on a single page. This phenomenon 
is particularly prevalent in the imagery used to adorn various undergraduate law 
textbooks. For the picture on a textbook (more than the often complex and 
difficult to remember text inside), reduces the concept of the family to the single 
picture or image which is being represented. The image lends itself to family 
law in particular, for the reproduction of an image on a textbook is analogous to 
‘the family’ itself; it relies upon reproduction, succession, passing down, 
exclusivity, and so forth. 
In many respects, the choice of the picture on the front of the textbook is a 
commercial marketing choice. What is chosen is chosen for reasons of 
increasing the books marketability and salability. A conscious choice is made 
first to have a picture, and second about what specific picture. Otherwise, all 
books (whether textbooks or not) would have plain covers, thereby saving on 
printing costs, royalties, and so forth.24 In marketing and commercial terms, the 
appearance of a book is of great importance to the publisher. Powers, for 
example, traces the development of the dust jacket from what he describes as 
‘utilitarian’ to a powerful modern-day marketing tool and modern art form.25 Not 
only can a particular cover have a major impact on the number of sales; it also 
helped to launch major publishing brands (Penguin and Bloomsbury being such 
examples). Given this, it can be seen that the presence of a picture is both an 
example of ‘legal symbolism’ and ‘commercial art’. In many respects, it matters 
not who (author or publisher) chose the cover, or for what reason. What matters 
for the purposes of this paper is the impact the book cover has on the subject 
who views it. The book cover has the same impact on the subject, regardless of 
who chose the picture and the rationale underlying the choice. 
The operation of this system of prejudices can be self-replicating. Given 
the ‘imperative’ demands made by the image, it is an intended outcome that the 
subject of law (in this instance, the law student) will subconsciously ingest and 
then reproduce a particular conception of the family, in very much the same way 
as law is reproductive of its own image — reproduction follows conception. In 
other words, we can say that, at the meeting of author and publisher, the idea of 
using a picture is conceived, then the picture is reproduced on the front cover of 
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the book, which in turn can play a significant part in reproducing a particular 
familial arrangement — that of the hetero-normative family. 
This prejudiced conception and reproduction engenders imagery, which in 
turn supports the cultural prejudice. Arguably, this is an example of the fact that 
if the same thing is repeated or reproduced enough times in enough ways, it 
becomes accepted as the ‘norm’. In this context, a symbol can originate as the 
symbol of the ‘reality’, but continues to be the symbol after the ‘reality’ has 
disappeared — it becomes a symbol of a fiction. During this process, it is 
‘forgotten’ that the symbol derives its legitimacy from legal and socially 
gendered constructs, and that these constructs are directly reliant on the 
essentialist family. What is also ‘forgotten’ is the presence of those established 
as ‘outside’ the familial symbol — the most obvious examples being families 
headed by a sole parent and same-sex families. What is ‘remembered’ is 
recalled through the associations contained within these representations of the 
image. Similarly, what is forgotten is therefore repressed, and the repression 
must occur if the interpretative process of construction of the heterosexual 
family is to take place: it occurs on a routine, ‘taken for granted’ basis. 
Therefore, the familial symbol attempts to ‘control’ what is remembered and 
what is forgotten. The power exercised by the picture or symbol masks those 
images which ‘law’ does not want to see. In other words, ‘law’ is analogous to a 
mirror — only the ‘desired’ image is reflected back to the observer: 
The art of law … is to be understood precisely as an art, as the 
construction of a mirror image, a portrait or icon that will serve both to 
represent and reflect. It represents in a perfect form the face of power, it 
portrays the absent cause of law, the other time of authority, while 
equally reflecting back to the subject of law the image if its own 
otherness, the mask or persona of legal subjectivity.26 
In exploring the issues mentioned above, I concentrate on six 
undergraduate family law textbooks; Bromley's Family Law,27 Law and the 
Family28 and The Family, Law and Society (third and fourth editions),29 Same Sex 
Relationships — From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay Marriage’30 and Cohabitation, 
Marriage and the Law: Social Change and Legal Reform in the 21st Century.31  
The first of these, Bromley’s Family Law, 8th edition, presents us with an 
image on the front cover which is of four figures who are depicted in outline 
only. The four figures are two adults and two children. As all the figures are 
shown in relief, it is only by looking at the outline of the figures that it becomes 
possible to determine that what is represented can be read as a family. By the 
stylised nature of the height and shape of these adult outlines, it can be assumed 
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48 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 1 
that one is male and one is female. By using imagery in this particular way, the 
book serves to promote one example of familial arrangement — that of two 
parents of opposite sexes with two children — as ‘the’ family. In other words, 
the imagery becomes ideological in the sense of conflating a particular 
conception of the family with the idea of ‘the’ family per se, thereby disguising 
its own relatively contingent status. The symbol of a nuclear family becomes the 
symbol for all families, due to a process of constant reinforcement and lack of 
critique. Other issues are raised by the appearance of the outlined figures. For 
example, the shorter of the two adult figures (presumably the female) is 
represented by long hair, the other (presumably the male) by short hair. 
Therefore, not only does the book promote a particular familial arrangement 
(ie heterosexual), it also prescribes how the individuals within that arrangement 
should be constructed, by both elaborating and then reinforcing the symbiotic 
nature of gender and sexuality within that familial relationship. 
The symbols on the front cover of Bromley’s Family Law are therefore 
restricted to a particularly narrow understanding of what a family is. Perhaps 
more importantly, it acts as a very wide exclusionary understanding of what a 
family is not. This notion of what a family is (as depicted by the cover), is 
reproduced and continued by the written rhetoric contained within the covers. 
How, then, is this depiction carried out and on what basis? How is the 
cultural construction routinely carried out? What are its assumptions and value 
judgments?  
Presumably, the front cover of Bromley’s Family Law is stating that the 
length of hair is representative of perceived notions of femininity and 
masculinity. The symbolic picture on the book cover states that to be male is to 
have short hair, and to be female is to have long hair. However, this is quite 
plainly nonsensical. Here, the images of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are 
therefore revealed to be crude stereotypes — a complete fiction. Bromley’s 
Family Law therefore uses legal and cultural constructions of gender to depict 
yet another socio-legal construction. 
The front cover of Bromley’s Family Law was presumably chosen because 
it was considered representative of a particular conceptual image of the family. 
The image on the front cover offers itself up as being representative of the 
‘essence’ of the family, which of course rests on the assumption that there is 
such a thing as an ‘essential family’. In addition to this, if such an assumption is 
made, the ‘essence’ is identifiable as the particular ‘thing’ it is without which it 
would not be identified as that ‘thing’.32 In this context, any given particular 
familial arrangement can be said to have certain common characteristics with 
any other given familial arrangement (such as love, companionship, 
cohabitation, and so forth), but it is important to stress that the socially 
constructed heterosexual nuclear family does not have a monopoly on the 
essence of the family. Yet the use of visual rhetoric on the book cover states this 
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to be the case. The book cover states that there is an ideal family. Raffield 
echoes this in his analysis of the importance of legal attire: ‘Control and 
manipulation of the image became the principle means whereby the ideal 
subject of law could be defined and recognised.’33 
The rhetorically powerful and influential nature of this pictorial 
representation should not be under-estimated. The first thing the reader sees 
every time the book is picked up is the visual rhetoric, which invents a context 
for the act of reading the content. This, in turn, is reinforced by the official 
sounding wording of the title, Bromley’s Family Law, which is stamped 
authoritatively on top of the cover across the pictorial images. It becomes 
apparent, then, that the field of vision on Bromley’s Family Law is limited to 
one of reflection, proselytising and structuring. Thus, the wording on the front 
cover reinforces and legitimates the pictorial representation and, of course, vice 
versa. Bottomley argues that the cover of the property law textbook is a ‘map’ to 
the rest of the book:34 ‘The cover becomes the frontier between two territories; a 
window into the text and a window from the text onto the world.’35 
The ‘window’ is there to be looked through. It also frames a selected ‘slice’ 
of ‘reality’ in a particular way and structures the frame of visibility. These 
‘windows’ allow any perception of the law to be gazed at but, as we have seen 
with Bromley’s Family Law, the (window of) opportunity is invariably not 
taken. The image(s) used are ‘safe’ and easily recognisable: 
they draw on an accepted aesthetics; and in this sense could be seen as 
rather safe and boring, they do not confront any of the problems of, for 
instance, non-figurative contemporary art but rather reproduce images we 
can all recognise and understand. They therefore do not utilise images or 
techniques which could signal that there are not only contemporary issues 
here, but issues which may be unsettling, difficult to recognise in the 
landscape.36 
When this approach is applied to the cover of Bromley’s Family Law, it 
becomes clear that not only does the cover act as a window on the text and vice 
versa, it presents a ‘safe’ and ‘cosy’ image of the family. There is nothing to 
suggest that there is or can be more to ‘a family’ than mother, father and 
children. Equally, there is nothing to suggest that there is, or can be more to 
‘family law’ than that law which is designed to ‘deal’ with this particular 
pictorial image. Bromley’s Family Law, in other words, does nothing to ‘rock 
the (family) boat’. There is nothing to suggest that a family headed, for example 
,by a same-sex couple would be an equally valid familial alternative to the 
image of a family that this particular text represents. It is interesting to note, 
therefore, that in the index of Bromley’s Family Law there are no listings or 
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references to homosexuals or lesbians, whereas in Dewar’s book there are three 
listings for homosexuals.37 
A question could be raised, however: if this is a book on family law, not 
sexuality or gender, why should there be any references to lesbian, homosexual 
or heterosexual? In response, I would suggest that the act of asking this question 
is an exclusionary one. To not include references to lesbian, homosexual or 
heterosexual is to state that these concepts are irrelevant to the legal 
construction of family. On the contrary, such concepts clearly should have a 
significant role, but are excluded and marginalised as only (hetero)sexuality is 
deemed to be relevant. 
The next family textbooks I wish to briefly consider are the third and fourth 
editions of Hoggett and Pearl’s The Family, Law and Society.38 The cover of the 
third edition features a photograph depicting Egyptian carvings of four figures 
(two adults and two children). The image presented to the viewer leaves no 
doubt about the sex of the two adults — they are male and female, as are the 
two children. Like the cover of Bromley’s Family Law, the picture can be read 
as representative of the ‘traditional heterosexual nuclear family’, yet the book 
professes to cover a wider range of ‘family law’ subjects than others.39 In other 
words, the book professes to cover a wide range of issues and, in comparison to 
other similar books, it probably does. However, its outward appearance still 
remains as ‘conservative’ as Bromley’s Family Law; it still presents the observer 
with a similar heterosexist agenda. Given the use of an image from antiquity, 
there is a notion of ‘timelessness’ here — the idea that this is the way that 
families have always been. 
Thus, if we accept the symbolism and iconography of what is presented on 
the front cover as reflecting the content of the book, then perhaps the book is not 
as ‘ground breaking’ as it would have us believe. The symbol and the icon 
‘encapsulate’ the ‘essence’ of that which is being symbolised — in this case, ‘a’ 
family and the text contained within the book. Yet this striving to express a 
static ‘essence’ requires a process of symbolism which can never be free of the 
gender politics and assumptions out of which it emerges, and which its own 
practices further support and sustain. In other words, because the essence may 
be difficult to determine or pin down, this can explain and uncover some of the 
tensions in the ongoing attempts to present the family as stable and unchanging. 
The differences between the third and fourth editions are quite striking. The 
fourth edition uses a portrait of a family40 consisting of seven individuals: two 
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adults and five children.41 The family in this painting is pictured in ‘domestic’ 
setting — a lounge.42 The adult woman is seated, and dressed in what are 
apparently casual clothes. She is also wearing a ring on the third finger of her 
left hand — it is possible to surmise, therefore, that she is married to the adult 
man. While there could be any number of possible permutation of this family 
(fostered, adopted, step, and so on), the picture can be read as representing or 
symbolising a biologically constituted family. The viewer’s eye is drawn 
particularly to the two adults portrayed in the picture. They are slightly off 
centre, but nevertheless occupy central positions. The adult male, who we can 
assume is the biological father, is standing behind the (presumed biological) 
mother and, although he too is apparently dressed casually, his clothes appear 
more formal than those of the mother as he is wearing a jacket and tie. The more 
formal attire of the man could be attributed to him usually inhabiting the public 
space of the office; he is either returning from or about to depart to the office. 
The five children are variously seated and standing. They are either side and 
slightly set back from the parents. All the figures which could be considered 
female in the group have longer hair than the males. This family can be read as 
being moulded into the basic building block of society — the respectable family 
of which law approves. The ‘conventionality’ of the family depicted is obvious. 
The depiction and representation of heterosexuality is felt strongly; even within 
this heterosexual conventionality there are other ‘rules’ complied with, even 
down to the length of hair — not only of the parents, but the children as well. 
In the preface to the fourth edition, the authors mention that they have 
welcomed two new authors, ‘who are members of a new generation of law 
teachers and can take the book on towards the next century’. They go on to state 
that: ‘As always there is no shortage of new developments to think about. It is 
hard to remember what life was like before the Children Act 1989; but many of 
the old debates have been replaced with others.’43 The written rhetoric clearly 
acknowledges ‘new developments’ and ‘new debates’, yet this awareness is not 
reflected on the front cover. The wording on the back cover states that: 
Particular emphasis is given to policy issues arising out of state 
intervention in family life and support for families in crisis or at risk, 
opening the book up to students on sociology, social work, social policy 
and history courses as well as anyone interested in family law or family 
policy. 
The book itself, then, clearly promotes itself as appealing to an audience 
wider than ‘just’ law students. This wording suggests the book is aiming to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive in its reach. However, I would argue that the 
‘inclusiveness’ implied in the written rhetoric is not reflected in the visual 
rhetoric. Again, the first rhetoric encountered by the student is the visual image 
                                                           
41  Incidentally, all of them are white. 
42  From their surroundings, it would seem reasonable to suggest the family is ‘middle 
income’. 
43  At p v. 
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presented to them on the front cover and, while most students would not 
consciously notice textbook covers until and unless they were pointed out to 
them, such covers add to the general (legal) culture.44 
There are, of course, different methodologies at play when choosing the 
cover of a textbook. The cover can be specially designed and commissioned for 
the book (Bromley’s Family Law being one such example); alternatively, like 
the 4th edition of Hoggett and Pearl’s book, they can be drawn from existing 
paintings. On the front cover of Dewar’s Law and the Family, we are presented 
with a reproduction of Diego Velasquez’s Las Meninas.45 The picture depicts a 
mixture of servants and the Spanish royal family, one of whom is the Infanta 
Margarita. The King and Queen and the painter himself are visible to us, the 
viewer, but only via their reflections in a mirror, which hangs on a back wall of 
the painting. 
The painting is an interpretation of a family; it is merely one way of 
reading the family. This interpretation is, in turn, used as the front cover of a 
textbook to represent ‘a’ family. In other words, we have a reproduction of an 
interpretation, used first as a symbol to reflect the context of the book, and 
second as a symbol for ‘a’ family generally. This links again to ideas of 
perception and viewing, and how we, as observers, view and observe. By 
depicting an ‘extended’ family, the painting clearly allows for the definitional 
boundaries of ‘family’ to be drawn wider than Bromley’s Family Law (which 
depicts a nuclear family).  
According to Foucault, the ‘observer’ is able to observe visual knowledge 
from an external perspective. Foucault’s work can facilitate the examination of 
the relationship(s) between text and pictures. To Foucault, Las Meninas 
exemplified this assumption.46 In his first chapter of The Order of Things, 
Foucault argued that Las Meninas was a reading of how the representation of 
the visual is an example of the representation of power. In other words, 
according to Foucault’s analysis of the painting, that which is outside the 
painting gives meaning to what is inside. The textbook cover is similarly 
‘outside’ the text contained therein. The picture on the outside of the book gives 
meaning to what is inside, and can be read as simultaneously defining and 
                                                           
4444  Two further books are worthy of brief mention. On the front cover of Cohabitation, 
Marriage and the Law Social Change and Legal Reform in the 21st Century 
(Barlow et al., 2005), the viewer is presented with yet more visual discourse. What 
is symbolic about this cover is that the pictorial representation chosen comprises 
two heterosexual individuals. Discourse includes imagery, and that imagery is 
symbolic of the continuing socio-legal construction of identity as heterosexual. On 
the cover of Same Sex Relationships: From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay Marriage’ 
(Cretney, 2006), the use of pink and blue confetti on the cover of this book has 
obvious gender performance connotations, and it is reasonable for the undergraduate 
student to assume (even on a subconscious level) that this is a ‘legitimate’ 
representation of the family. 
45  Oil on canvas. Museo del Prado, Madrid, Spain. The title refers to the ladies in 
waiting who accompany the Infanta Margarita. It was completed in 1656. It was 
originally referred to as La Familia (‘The Family’): Levey (1971), p 147. 
46  Foucault (1970). 
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producing the objects of knowledge. The pictorial representation used on 
Dewar’s book can act as a reflection of the text contained within it.47 
Some Conclusions 
This paper has suggested that there is a particular way of ‘reading’ textbook 
covers. In so doing, it has privileged one particular form of analysis. I make no 
excuse for that. There are indeed a significant number of ‘readings’ that can be 
offered in relation to any picture or visual image, not just those on a textbook. 
The analysis offered here has concerned itself mainly with exploring the 
dominant ideology of gender expectations and the promotion of hetero-
normatively on textbook covers. I recognize, however, that this paper forms 
only a small part of the debate and does not pretend to address or answer all of 
the many problems associated with the interactions of image, law and family. 
There is a great deal of further work which can be done in this area, and many 
more complexities and nuances to be uncovered. There is, of course, a multitude 
of different ways of seeing and reading textbook covers. One of the purposes of 
this paper has been to suggest that legal culture privileges particular familial 
forms via visual rhetoric, not to suggest that one particular form of visual 
rhetoric should be privileged over another. In the light of this, I would propose 
that the pictures and symbols appearing on textbooks should be the subject of 
continuing debate, challenge and scrutiny. Symbols are capable of constituting 
visual rhetoric, and as such they impact on the observer in constructing and 
shaping the observer’s perception of familial arrangements. This ‘constructing’ 
and ‘shaping’ constitutes a process of repetition in which layer upon layer is 
added over previous images, drawing from them a series of presumed linkages 
and reinforcing the symbols’ legitimacy. Legal culture thus promotes a 
particular familial arrangement through the repetition of the symbol. It is this 
repetition that is used to justify a series of legal symbols which are embedded in 
a ‘closed and sterile symbolic field’ of endless repetition.48 If it is important to 
be aware of that which attempts to construct or obstruct perception, to uncover 
previously unseen interpretations or hidden meanings, then visual rhetoric 
should not be excluded from scrutiny. 
Further, if such constructs are not recognised as being ‘mere’ constructs, 
they then become treated as absolutes — and there is nothing absolute in a 
picture or symbol. The above discussion has, I hope, gone some way towards 
illustrating this. There are many possible images and symbols from which to 
chose the subject-matter of a textbook cover, but the ‘impact’ of that choice is as 
important for visual rhetoric as it is for written rhetoric. What is chosen 
                                                           
47  One review of Law and the Family stated that it was a ‘refreshing approach to the 
subject, a stimulating and invigorating read and a good introduction to law and the 
family today. Not many of its problems would have been known by Velasquez 
whose Meninas graces the cover — what I wonder were the publishers or the author 
intending to convey by reproducing this classic? Not surely that time stands still!’ 
Freeman, M. (1994) SPTL, Spring. 
48  McCahery (1993), p , 397-421. 
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therefore has the potential to become visual rhetoric, which is just as important 
as the written rhetoric contained within the covers.  
Visual rhetoric provides a symbolic imperative, a ‘template’ that makes 
certain demands on any subject, not just a legal subject. It instructs the observer 
as to how families and the individuals within that familial group should be 
constituted (even to the extent of proscribing hair length). Visual rhetoric 
demands that families be structured along prescriptive notions of identity, the 
individuals within that family being clearly defined and understood in gendered 
and sexualised terms. One of the consequences of not engaging in a continuing 
debate, challenge and scrutiny of images is that there will be familial groups 
which continue to be omitted from representation. Familial groups which are not 
represented in the picture or image are not seen by viewer, nor do they see 
themselves reflected in the visual rhetoric (such as same-sex families), and are 
consequently placed lower down the legal hierarchy — sometimes to the point 
of complete exclusion. 
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